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Abstract We provide two new characterizations of exact games. First, a game is
exact if and only if it is exactly balanced; and second, a game is exact if and only if it
is totally balanced and overbalanced. The condition of exact balancedness is identical
to the one of balancedness, except that one of the balancing weights may be negative,
while for overbalancedness one of the balancing weights is required to be non-positive
and no weight is put on the grand coalition. Exact balancedness and overbalancedness
are both easy to formulate conditions with a natural game-theoretic interpretation and
are shown to be useful in applications. Using exact balancedness we show that exact
games are convex for the grand coalition and we provide an alternative proof that
the classes of convex and totally exact games coincide. We provide an example of a
game that is totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but not exact. Finally
we relate classes of balanced, totally balanced, convex for the grand coalition, exact,
totally exact, and convex games to one another.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that the core in a transferable utility game is non-empty if and only if
the game is balanced (Bondareva 1963; Shapley 1967).1 The core of every subgame
of a transferable utility game is non-empty if and only if the game is totally balanced.
Totally balanced games turn up in a wide range of applications. They coincide with
market games (Shapley and Shubik 1969); also with a special case of market games
with a continuum of indivisible commodities (Legut 1990); they are equivalent to a
class of maximum flow problems (Kalai and Zemel 1982a); and also to permutation
games of less than four players (Tijs et al. 1984). Moreover, totally balanced games
are generated by linear production games (Owen 1975), generalized network prob-
lems (Kalai and Zemel 1982b), and controlled mathematical programming problems
(Dubey and Shapley 1984).
In this paper we study a subclass of totally balanced games, exact games (Schmeidler
1972). Exact games have the following applications. Calleja et al. (2005) show that
the class of multi-issue allocation games equals the class of non-negative exact games.
Csóka et al. (2009) demonstrate that the class of exact games coincides with the class
of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty. Branzei et al. (2009) show that
convex multi-choice games are exact. It has been shown that largeness, extendability
and exactness coincide in chain-component additive games (van Velzen et al. 2008)
and also in simple flow games (Fang et al. 2010). Casas-Méndez et al. (2003) prove
that if one takes any exact game and a coalitional structure, then the resulting coali-
tional game will be quasi balanced. If a game is quasi balanced, then their proposed
solution concept, the coalitonal τ -value can be defined.
We provide a set of linear programming problems by which one can easily check
whether a game is exact or not. Using the dual we develop two new characterizations
of exact games complementing those by Schmeidler (1972) and Azrieli and Lehrer
(2005).
The first characterization of the class of exact games is the condition of exact bal-
ancedness. One interpretation of balancedness is the following. Each coalition forms
for a non-negative amount of time being such that each player works exactly one unit
of time together in the coalitions to which he belongs. In doing so the players cannot
generate more value than when all work a full unit of time for the grand coalition. The
condition for exact balancedness is identical to the one of balancedness, except that
one coalition is allowed to form during a negative amount of time. We can think of
this as the other coalitions working overtime and paying the opportunity cost of doing
so to the coalition that forms during a negative amount of time. We show that exact
balancedness implies total balancedness.
The second characterization spells out what more than total balancedness is needed
to obtain exactness. It says that a game is exact if an only if it is totally balanced and
1 Carpente et al. (2010) show that the truncated core in a transferable utility game is non-empty if and only
if the game is t-balanced.
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overbalanced. In case of overbalancedness, no weight is put on the grand coalition and
one coalition works a non-negative amount of overtime. From this characterization it
follows immediately that an exact game is totally balanced.
We demonstrate the simplicity of exact balancedness in applications. Biswas et al.
(1999) show that totally exact games are convex (and that convex games are totally
exact). Using exact balancedness we provide an alternative proof of this result.
We also study games that are convex for the grand coalition, where convexity is
only required for coalitions whose union is the set of all players. We show that exact
balancedness implies that a game is convex for the grand coalition, which leads to the
result that exact games in case of at most three players are convex. Using the intuition
behind exact balancedness, we provide an example of a game which is both totally
balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but which is not exact.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with the notation and the necessary
definitions. In Sect. 3 we study the balancedness conditions for exact games. In Sect. 4
we demonstrate the usefulness of our characterizations of exact games. We conclude
the paper with a summary of how the classes of balanced, totally balanced, convex for
the grand coalition, exact, totally exact, and convex games are related to one another.
2 Notation and definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a finite set of players, N is the collection of non-empty
subsets of N , and D is the collection of non-empty subsets of a coalition D ∈ N . A
value function v : 2N → R satisfying that v(∅) = 0 gives rise to a cooperative game
with transferable utility (game, for short) (N , v). Let  denote the set of games with
n players. An allocation is a vector x ∈ Rn , where xi is the payoff of player i ∈ N .
For a coalition C ∈ N , let x(C) = ∑i∈C xi . An allocation x ∈ Rn is called efficient
if x(N ) = v(N ), individually rational if xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N , and coalitionally
rational if x(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ N . The core is the set of efficient and coalitionally
rational allocations.
For each C ∈ N , a(C) ∈ Rn is the membership vector in C , where ai (C) = 1 if
i ∈ C and ai (C) = 0 otherwise. We define R+ = [0,∞).
Definition 2.1 A balanced vector of weights is (λC )C∈N such that λC ∈ R+ for all
C ∈ N and ∑C∈N λC a(C) = a(N ). A game (N , v) is balanced if
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤
v(N ) for all balanced vectors of weights (λC )C∈N .
Let b denote the class of balanced games with n players. A well-known inter-
pretation of balancedness is that if the players distribute one unit of working time
to any coalition and each coalition is active during λC time units, then the players
cannot generate more value than v(N ), when working a full unit of time for the grand
coalition. Balancedness is a necessary and sufficient condition for the core in a trans-
ferable utility game to be non-empty (Bondareva 1963; Shapley 1967); Predtetchinski
and Herings (2004) provide the corresponding necessary and sufficient balancedness
conditions for non-transferable utility games.
For a game (N , v) and a coalition D ∈ N the subgame (D, vD) is obtained by
restricting v to subsets of D.
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Definition 2.2 A game (N , v) is totally balanced if for every D ∈ N its subgame
(D, vD) is balanced, that is, if for all D ∈ N and for all vectors (λC )C∈D such that




In a totally balanced game every subgame has a non-empty core. Let tb denote
the class of totally balanced games with n players.
Schmeidler (1972) introduces exact games.
Definition 2.3 A game (N , v) is exact if for each C ∈ N there exists a core allocation
x such that x(C) = v(C).
Let e denote the class of exact games with n players. Convex games (Shapley
1971) can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.4 A game (N , v) is convex if for all S, T ∈ 2N we have v(S) + v(T ) ≤
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Let c denote the class of convex games with n players. Convex games are exact
(Schmeidler 1972). We now introduce the new notion of convexity for the grand coa-
lition.
Definition 2.5 A game (N , v) is convex for the grand coalition if for all S, T ∈ 2N
such that S ∪ T = N we have v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(N ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Let cg denote the set of games which are convex for the grand coalition. Following
Biswas et al. (1999), we define totally exact games analogously to totally balanced
games.
Definition 2.6 A game (N , v) is totally exact if for every D ∈ N its subgame (D, vD)
is exact.
Let te denote the class of totally exact games with n players.
3 Exact games and balancedness
Consider a game (N , v) ∈ . For each coalition D ∈ N we develop a linear program-
ming problem related to the game (N , v). The linear program is such that whenever
(N , v) is exact, any optimal solution x∗ is a core allocation satisfying x∗(D) = v(D).
We denote the linear program by Pv,D and its dual by P∗v,D.









C∈N λC a(C) = a(N )
a(D)x = v(D) λC ∈ R+, C ∈ N \{D}
x ∈ Rn λD ∈ R.
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Let us discuss the primal. The first part of the feasibility constraints requires that
x is coalitionally rational for all coalitions but coalition D. The second part of the
feasibility constraints requires that x(D) = v(D), that is, x should be efficient in the
subgame (D, vD), so a feasible solution yields a core element in the subgame (D, vD).
If (D, vD) is a balanced game, then the set of feasible solutions is non-empty, since
we have a core element in the subgame (D, vD) and the other elements of a feasible
solution can be chosen sufficiently large. In this case the set of optimal solutions of
Pv,D is also non-empty since the set of feasible solutions is bounded from below. If
(D, vD) is not balanced, then the set of feasible solutions of Pv,D is empty, since
then (D, vD) has no core allocations. If x∗ is an optimal solution of the primal, then
ov,D = a(N )x∗ is the value of the optimal solution, which by the duality theorem of
linear programming is the same as the optimal objective value of the dual. If Pv,D has
no optimal solutions, then we define ov,D = ∞. The linear programming problems
are related to exactness as follows.
Proposition 3.1 A game (N , v) ∈  is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N we have
that ov,D = v(N ).
Proof (⇒) The proof is by contradiction. Take any exact game (N , v) ∈ e and
assume that there is a coalition D ∈ N such that ov,D = v(N ). Let x∗ be an optimal
solution of Pv,D . Using the feasibility constraints of the primal we have that a(N )x∗ >
v(N ). As (N , v) is exact there exists a core element x such that x(D) = v(D) and
x(N ) = v(N ). The vector x satisfies the feasibility constraints and has objective value
a(N )x = v(N ) < a(N )x∗, a contradiction.
(⇐)
Consider some D ∈ N and let x∗ be an optimal solution of (Pv,D), so a(N )x∗ =
v(N ), that is x∗ is efficient. The efficiency and the feasibility constraints imply that
x∗ is a core allocation of (N , v) with x(D) = v(D). Thus (N , v) is exact. unionsq
Let us continue by analyzing the dual, P∗v,D . The value of its optimal solution is at
least v(N ), since v(N ) is obtained by setting λN = 1 and λC = 0 for all C ∈ N \{N }.
It follows from optimality that ov,D = v(N ) if and only if for all feasible solutions
of P∗v,D the value of the objective function is not larger than v(N ). Using this obser-
vation, Proposition 3.1, and the duality theorems in linear programming we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 A game (N , v) ∈  is exact if and only if for every D ∈ N and
for each vector (λC )C∈N such that for C ∈ N \ {D}, λC ∈ R+, λD ∈ R, and∑
C∈N λC a(C) = a(N ) we have
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N ).
In Theorem 3.5 below, we rewrite the conditions in Corollary 3.2 using exact bal-
ancedness, defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 An exactly balanced vector of weights is a vector (λC )C∈N such that
for some D ∈ N , λD ∈ R, for all C = D, λC ∈ R+, and ∑C∈N λC a(C) = a(N ).
A game (N , v) is exactly balanced if
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N ) for all exactly balanced
vectors of weights.
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Let eb denote the class of exactly balanced games with n players. Notice that
the only difference to the condition of balancedness is that one weight, λD can be
arbitrary (negative, zero, or positive). Due to this extra freedom, the set of exactly
balanced vectors is larger than the set of balanced vectors, hence it is more difficult to
satisfy exact balancedness than balancedness. To interpret a negative weight, consider
the following example.
Example 3.4 Take an arbitrary game (N , v) with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. If all
other balancing weights are set to zero, then setting λ{1} = 1, λ{2} = 1, λ{1,3} =
1, λ{2,4} = 1, λ{1,2} = −1 constitutes an exactly balanced vector of weights. For exact
balancedness
v({1}) + v({2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({2, 4}) − v({1, 2}) ≤ v({1, 2, 3, 4}) (1)
should hold. Equation (1) can be interpreted as follows. Players in the coalition with
the negative weight, here coalition ({1, 2}), work overtime, each member allocating
−λ{1,2} extra time among the remaining coalitions. Equation (1) says that when the
opportunity cost of this extra effort is subtracted, the whole set of players cannot gen-
erate more value than the grand coalition. This is even more apparent after rearranging:
v({1}) + v({2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({2, 4}) ≤ v({1, 2, 3, 4}) + v({1, 2}), (2)
thus working for the grand coalition and working overtime in the coalition with the
negative weight is preferable.
Exact balancedness is a necessary and sufficient condition for a game to be exact,
as the following theorem claims.
Theorem 3.5 A game (N , v) ∈  is exact if and only if it is exactly balanced, that is
e = eb.
Proof This follows immediately from Corollary 3.2. unionsq
Exact games can also be characterized by total balancedness and overbalancedness,
to be defined next.
Definition 3.6 An overbalanced vector of weights is a vector (μC )C∈N \{N } such that
μC ∈ R+ for all C ∈ N \{N } and ∑C∈N \{D,N } μC a(C) = a(N )+μDa(D) for some
D ∈ N . A game (N , v) is overbalanced if ∑C∈N \{D,N } μCv(C) ≤ v(N )+μDv(D)
for all overbalanced vectors of weights.
Let ob denote the class of overbalanced games with n players. The difference
between balancedness and overbalancedness is that in the case of overbalancedness,
no weight is put on the grand coalition and one weight is non-positive (after rearrang-
ing we get −μD ≤ 0). As in Eq. (2), the overbalancedness condition requires that
working for the grand coalition and working a non-negative amount of overtime in
coalition D is the best choice players can make.
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Theorem 3.7 A game (N , v) ∈  is exact if and only if it is totally balanced and
overbalanced, that is e = tb ∩ ob.
Proof We show that a game (N , v) ∈  is totally balanced and overbalanced if and
only if it is exactly balanced.
(⇐) For D ∈ N \{N }, to show balancedness of (D, vD) it is sufficient to restrict
attention to balanced vectors of weights where the weight on D is equal to zero. This
is obtained by setting the exactly balanced weights such that λN = 1, λD = −1, and
λC = 0 for all C /∈ D. Balancedness of (N , v) is obtained by considering exactly
balanced vectors of weights where all the weights are non-negative. Using exactly
balanced vectors of weights with λN = 0 and λD ≤ 0 implies overbalancedness
of (N , v).
(⇒) Take any exactly balanced vector of weights (λC )C∈N with λD ∈ R, λC ∈ R+
for C ∈ N \ {D}, and
∑
C∈N
λC a(C) = a(N ). (3)
It follows immediately that λN ≤ 1. We discuss two cases depending on the value of
λN .




1 − λN a(C) = a(N ). (4)
If λD ≤ 0, then exact balancedness is implied by overbalancedness of (N , v),
otherwise by balancedness of (N , v).
2. λN = 1. If λD ≥ 0, then exact balancedness is trivially satisfied since (3) implies




−λD a(C) = a(D). (5)
Note that (5) implies that λC = 0 for all C /∈ D and exact balancedness follows
from balancedness of (D, vD). unionsq
Theorem 3.7 characterizes exact games as being the only totally balanced and over-
balanced games. It follows immediately that an exact game is totally balanced, which
was also shown by Schmeidler (1972). The result shows that exact games constitute the
subset of totally balanced games that satisfies the extra condition of overbalancedness,
where no weight is put on the grand coalition and one weight should be non-positive
when checking the “normal” balancedness of the game.
Schmeidler (1972) characterizes exact games as follows (see Derks and Reijnierse
(1998), Theorem 7).
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Theorem 3.8 (Schmeidler 1972) A game (N , v) ∈  is exact if and only if for
every D∈N \{N }, for each vector (γC )C∈N such that γC ∈ R+ for all C ∈ N
and
∑
C∈N \{N } γC a(C) = a(D) + γN a(N ) we have
∑
C∈N \{N } γCv(C) ≤ v(D) +
γN v(N ).
Next, we provide a direct proof of the equivalence of Schmeidler’s characterization
of exactness and the characterization in Theorem 3.7.
First, we show that Schmeidler’s characterization of exactness implies total balanc-
edness and overbalancedness. That (D, vD) is balanced for D ∈ N \ {N } follows by
setting γN = 0 and γC = 0 for all C /∈ D. Take a balanced vector of weights (λC )C∈N .
Balancedness of (N , v) follows from weights such that γN = 1 and γD = λD +1 ≥ 1.
Overbalanced weights satisfy the equality
∑
C∈N \{D,N }
μC a(C) = a(N ) + μDa(D). (6)
The case where μD = 0 follows from Schmeidler’s characterization with γN = 1 and







a(N ) + a(D).
It is now easily seen that this case is implied by Schmeidler’s characterization when
we choose γD = 0, γN = 1/μD, and γC = μC/μD for C ∈ N \ {D, N }.
Second, we show that total balancedness and overbalancedness imply Schmeidler’s
characterization of exactness. The balancing weights of Schmeidler satisfy
∑
C∈N \{N }
γC a(C) = a(D) + γN a(N ). (7)
In this case Schmeidler’s condition is
∑
C∈N \{N } γCv(C) ≤ v(D) + γN v(N ). If
γN = 0, then (7) implies that γC = 0 for all C /∈ D and thus the balancedness of






a(C) + γD − 1
γN
a(D) = a(N ),
and Schmeidler’s condition follows from balancedness. If γN > 0 and γD < 1, then





a(C) = a(N ) + 1 − γD
γN
a(D),
so Schmeidler’s condition follows from overbalancedness.
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For a coalition C ∈ N let |C | denote the number of players involved in the coali-
tion. Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) give the following necessary and sufficient conditions
for exactness.
Theorem 3.9 (Azrieli and Lehrer, 2005, Proposition 2) A game (N , v) ∈  is exact
if and only if for every D ∈ N , for each vector (αC )C∈N such that αC ∈ R+ for all









|C| ≤ β v(D)|D| + (1 − β)v(N )|N | .
Notice that in Theorem 3.9 if D = N , we have the usual balancedness condition
expressed in terms of average worth. It is however not straightforward to give an
interpretation to the condition in terms of average worth.
One can also show that the characterization by Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) is equiv-
alent to the characterization by total balancedness and overbalancedness.
Our characterizations of exact games differ from the ones by Schmeidler (1972)
and by Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) in that a weight of one is put on a(N ). This way we
can employ the usual interpretation of balancedness, where players allocate one unit
of time over the various coalitions, but now players in the coalition with a negative
weight work overtime. In doing so, to satisfy our conditions working for the grand
coalition and working overtime in the coalition with the negative weight should be the
best choice players can make.
4 Applications of exact balancedness
In this section we show a number of applications of the condition of exact balanced-
ness (Definition 3.3). First we demonstrate that exact games are convex for the grand
coalition (Definition 2.5) and the class of totally exact games (Definition 2.6) coin-
cides with the class of convex games (Definition 2.4). Then we discuss games with
at most three players, where exact games turn out to be convex. Finally, we present
an example of a game with four players that is totally balanced, convex for the grand
coalition, but not exact.
Proposition 4.1 If the game (N , v) is exact, then it is convex for the grand coalition,
e ⊆ cg.
Proof Take two coalitions S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∪ T = N . Let D = S ∩ T . Since
(N , v) is exact, by Theorem 3.5 it is exactly balanced. We define an exactly balanced
vector of weights by setting λS = 1, λT = 1, and λD = −1. All other balancing
weights are set to zero. Notice that this constitutes an exactly balanced vector of
weights, since a(S) + a(T ) − a(D) = a(N ). By exact balancedness we have that
v(S) + v(T ) − v(D) ≤ v(N ), that is v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(N ) + v(S ∩ T ). unionsq
Theorem 4.2 A game is totally exact if and only if it is convex, te = c.
Proof (⇒) Since by Proposition 4.1 exact games are convex for the grand coalition,
totally exact games are convex for all coalitions, that is they are convex.
(⇐) It is known that convex games are exact (Schmeidler 1972). Since a subgame
of a convex game is also convex, we have total exactness. unionsq
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The following result claims that a game with at most three players that is totally
balanced and convex for the grand coalition has to be convex.
Proposition 4.3 Assume that there are at most three players. If the game (N , v) is
totally balanced and convex for the grand coalition, then it is convex.
Proof For one or two player games the claim requires no proof. Consider the case with
three players. For coalitions S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∪ T = N convexity follows from
the convexity for the grand coalition. When S ∩ T = {∅}, S ∪ T = C , where C is a
two-player coalition, convexity follows from total balancedness. When S ⊆ T , where
T is a two-player coalition, convexity follows since S ∩ T = S and S ∪ T = T . unionsq
Exact games are totally balanced (Theorem 3.7) and convex for the grand coalition
(Proposition 4.1): e ⊆ tb ∩cg. Since a convex game is exact, using Proposition 4.3
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4 Assume that there are at most three players. Then a game is exact if
and only if it is convex.
There exist games that are convex for the grand coalition, but that are not totally
balanced, and games that are totally balanced, but not convex for the grand coalition,
so tb ∩ cg  tb and tb ∩ cg  cg. Theorem 3.7 and Proposition 4.1 imply that
e ⊆ tb ∩cg. We consider next the question whether there are games that are totally
balanced and convex for the grand coalition, but not exact. Using the intuition behind
exact balancedness we provide an example of such a game in Example 4.5, therefore
e  tb ∩ cg.
Example 4.5 We present a game that is totally balanced and convex for the grand
coalition, but not exact. By Proposition 4.3 we need at least four players. Consider the
following game with four players. Let
v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = v({4}) = 0,
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = v({1, 4}) = 1,
v({2, 3}) = v({2, 4}) = v({3, 4}) = 0,
v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = 1,
v({2, 3, 4}) = 0,
v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 2.
The game (N , v) is totally balanced, since every subgame (C, vC ) where C con-
tains player 1 has a core element where player 1 receives v(C) and the other players
nothing, and the zero vector is a core element of all other subgames. The game (N , v)
is convex for the grand coalition as v(N ) = 2 weakly exceeds the sum of the value of
any other two coalitions. We show that the game (N , v) is not exactly balanced. Let
D = ({1}) and consider the weights λ{1,2} = λ{1,3} = λ{1,4} = 1, λ{1} = −2, and set
all other weights equal to zero. These weights constitute an exactly balanced vector of
weights, since a({1, 2})+a({1, 3})+a({1, 4})− 2a({1}) = a({1, 2, 3, 4}). However,
v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({1, 4}) − 2v({1}) = 3 > 2 = v({1, 2, 3, 4}), thus v is not
exact.
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Fig. 1 Subsets of balanced games
The relationships between the various classes of games are summarized in Fig. 1.
As a future line of research, one can look for generalizations of exact balancedness
for non-transferable utility (NTU) games. The first step was done by Csóka et al.
(2011) by defining exactness and relating it to the various notions of convexity in the
NTU setting.
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